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INTRODUCTION
In March 2008, after a two-year grand jury investigation, the federal
government indicted then-governor of Puerto Rico, Amnbal S. Acevedo Vild, leader
of the pro-Commonwealth Popular Democratic Party (PDP), on nineteen counts of
campaign finance fraud.' Members of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party
(NPP) clamored for Acevedo Vild's impeachment.2 Attempting to imbue the
subsequent proceedings with the appearance of neutrality, the court brought in
United States District of New Hampshire Judge Paul Barbadoro to try the case. On
an island where over eighty percent of the population votes in gubernatorial
elections, it would be virtually impossible to find a jury of individuals without
strong ties to either the PDP or the NPP.3 Nonetheless, Judge Barbadoro
preemptively announced that he would deny all motions for a change of venue and
declared his intention to brook few delays in the commencement of the trial. His
statements satisfied the public's desire for a speedy resolution of the drama that had
been brewing on the island for many months, 4 but in the federal courthouse, they
mandated immediate attention to a serious problem.
At the time of Barbadoro's announcement, the entire federal jury pool for the
District of Puerto Rico numbered fewer than five hundred people 5 out of the
island's four million inhabitants.6 Due to the English-language requirement for
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to Luis Fuentes-Rohwer at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Steven Macias at the University
of Oregon School of Law and to my colleagues at California Western, Ruben Garcia, Tom Barton, and
William Aceves, for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I am also indebted to my
friends and colleagues in Puerto Rico, particularly Jorge Sierra, Gerardo Vasquez, Ryan Lozar, Jos6
Antonio Fust6, and Sarah Spiegel.
1. Kirk Semple, U.S. Issues Indictment of Governor in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at
A16.
2. Id.
3. See Anibal S. Acevedo VilI, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics
/people/a/anibal-s -acevedo-vila/index.html (last updated Mar. 24, 2009) ("Governor's races are always
impassioned in Puerto Rico, where a mind-boggling 80-plus percent of voters turn out on Election
Day.").
4. See David Johnston, Puerto Rico's Governor, Under Inquiry, Sees Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2007, at A24 (quoting Acevedo Vili's statement that the investigation had already been ongoing for two
and a half years).
5. Interview with Jos6 Antonio Fustd, Chief Judge, D.P.R. (March 2008).
6. Puerto Rican Population, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, http://2010.census.gov/mediacenter/po
rtrait-of-america/puerto-rican-population.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
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jurors,7 this pool was smaller than ones from which courts often draw to create a
jury for only one controversial case. Not only was the pool impossibly small, it was
also highly imbalanced, consisting almost entirely of the island's elite: a group of
financially secure, educated individuals, many of whom had studied in the United
States.8 In short, the jury pool did not represent a cross section of the community,
as required by the Sixth Amendment 9 and federal law. ' 0
The district court faced another language-rights challenge preceding the
November 2008 election, in which Acevedo VilA still intended to run, in spite of
his pending trial." A group of minority English-speakers, eager to participate in
this controversial election, moved the court to order Puerto Rico's election
committee to print ballots in English and Spanish for the first time.'2 Granting this
request, the district court invoked the Voting Rights Act, a statute that, read
literally, bestows no rights on minority English-speakers. 3 The law was not written
to accommodate this group whose existence legislators failed to anticipate. The
court also ordered bilingual ballots based on the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 14 To support this aspect of the decision, the court labeled
"natives of the continental United States" a racial minority based on the association
between English and national origin in Puerto Rico. 5
Analysis of the deprivation of Sixth Amendment rights in Puerto Rico and the
absurdity of applying the Voting Rights Act to an English minority or creating a
racial category of continental Americans reveals the injustice inherent in Puerto
Rico's current status. After exploring the tension between federal and constitutional
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2)-(3) (2006).
8. Cf Josd Juliin Alvarez Gonzdlez, Law, Language, and Statehood: The Role of English in the
Great State of Puerto Rico, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN ExPANSION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 289, 290 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (stating that
fluency in English reflects socioeconomic class).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975) ("Both in the
course of exercising its supervisory powers over trials in federal courts and in the constitutional context,
the Court has unambiguously declared that the American concept of a jury trial contemplates a jury
drawn from afair cross section of the community.") (emphasis added).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled
to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section
of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.").
11. John Marino, Embattled Puerto Rico Governor Seeks Re-election, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2008, 5:08
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2743592420080427 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
12. Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Col6n, 587 F. Supp. 2d 338, 341 (D.P.R. 2008), vacated, 587 F.3d 445
(1 st Cir. 2009), affg corrected order on reconsideration, 606 F. Supp. 2d 222 (2009).
13. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 343 ("Because we find that the Spanish-only ballots violate the
Voting Rights Act . . . we grant the injunctive relief requested .... ); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (2010)
("No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group.").
14. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 343. The relief requested included an injunction requiring
Puerto Rico to print bilingual Spanish- and English-language ballots for the 2008 elections. Id. at 340.
15. Id. at 347 ("While groups of people who share a linguistic background do not always correspond
to any definite racial or ethnic group, this case implicates the electoral rights of English speakers in a
predominantly Spanish-speaking jurisdiction. In Puerto Rico, use of English is frequently identified with
natives of the continental United States, as a distinct national category apart from native-born Puerto
Ricans, for whom Spanish remains their mother tongue.") (citations omitted).
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law and the linguistic reality of Puerto Rico, this Essay will therefore call for a
dramatic change in Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States to prevent
further contradictions and inequities.
Part I reviews and analyzes courts' attempts to reconcile the conflict between
the statutory English-language requirement for federal jurors,' 6 Puerto Rico's
almost entirely Spanish-speaking population, and the Sixth Amendment's
constitutional mandate. This part consists of three sub-parts: a description of Puerto
Rico's linguistic landscape in comparison with that of the United States, a history
of fair cross section challenges pertaining to the District of Puerto Rico, and a
comparative look at fair cross section' 7 challenges in the Ninth Circuit. Part II
examines the tension between language and constitutional rights through the lens of
one case, Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Col6n. 18 In this challenge to the policies of Puerto
Rico's election commission, the district court relied on the Voting Rights Act, the
Equal Protection clause, and the First Amendment to order the printing of bilingual
ballots for the 2008 gubernatorial election.' 9 In light of the legal gymnastics and
concessions required to reach the courts' holdings on both of these matters, this
Essay concludes that the state of linguistic colonialism presently existing between
the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is legally and morally
untenable.
I. THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT AND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
To qualify for jury service in a federal district court, a person must be able to
speak English and to read, write, and understand it "with a degree of proficiency
sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form."20 Both the United
States Constitution, under the Sixth Amendment, and federal law, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1861, require federal jury pools to re present a cross section of the community in
which judicial proceedings occur.2' Nonetheless, courts have consistently rejected
challenges to the English-language requirement as it applies to the District of
Puerto Rico, where the requirement excludes approximately eighty percent of the
district's population from federal jury service and renders the remaining pool
relatively homogenous with regard to class and education levels.22 Although the
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2)-(3).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.")
18. 587 F. Supp. 2d 338.
19. Id. at 343.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2)-(3).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."); U.S. CONST. amend.
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... ). The statutory
and constitutional analyses are the same, United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1077 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
22. See, e.g., Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1958) (rejecting a challenge to the
English-language requirement stating that it is "reasonable and indeed necessary to the proper
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First Circuit's response to this question is consistent with outcomes reached in
other circuits facing fair cross section challenges,23 marked cultural and linguistic
differences likely render this symmetry irrelevant to the correctness of the First
Circuit's analysis.
In other federal judicial districts, most notably in the Ninth Circuit, defendants
have failed to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional underrepresentation
based on a comparison of the percentage of Spanish speakers, or "'Hispanics,"' on
a jury and the number of jury-eligible Hispanics in the community.2 4 The law has
developed with a narrow focus on whether the proper point of comparison is the
whole or the jury-eligible population, without reaching the issues of whether
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion, and, if so, whether significant
national interests balance out the harm of that exclusion.25 In contrast, cases arising
in Puerto Rico, an island almost entirely populated by Spanish speakers, have
focused entirely on whether significant national interests justify the conceded
exclusion of the majority of the population from jury service.
Part I begins with a description of Puerto Rico's linguistic landscape as well as
the statistics and court rules relevant to an inquiry into the effect of the English-
language requirement. It then reviews the most significant First Circuit and District
of Puerto Rico cases analyzing and establishing the constitutionality of the English-
language requirement in the face of fair cross section challenges. Next, it traces the
development of fair cross section law in the Ninth Circuit where, due to the high
functioning of the court as a member of the federal judicial system"); United States v. Benmuhar, 658
F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that the national-language interest encompassed in the English
proficiency requirement is significant and did not deny defendant his Sixth Amendment right to a
representative jury), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982); United States v. Aponte-Suirez, 905 F.2d 483,
492 (lst Cir. 1990) (asserting "the overwhelming national interest served by the use of English in a
United States court justifies conducting proceedings in the District of Puerto Rico in English and
requiring jurors to be proficient in that language.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 990 (1990);
United States v. Gonzdlez-V6lez, 466 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing its own ruling in finding jurors
must be proficient in English and denying defendant's claim for violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights). Although there are currently no statistics demonstrating this assertion, one scholar believes that
Puerto Ricans eligible for jury service are also racially homogeneous. See Jasmine Gonzales Rose,
Language Rights In Puerto Rico, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Hemandez, 447 F.3d 699, 702 n. I (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that
to be "jury eligible" one must, among other things, be able to speak English (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1865(b)(l)-(3))).
24. See, e.g., id. at 705-06 ("[A] 2.0 percentage point absolute disparity between the percentage of
jury-eligible Hispanics and the percentage of Hispanics on [the defendant's] grand jury venire was
constitutionally insignificant).
25. See, e.g., id at 701. "A district court need not and may not take into account Hispanics who are
ineligible for jury service to determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on grand jury venires.
To establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that grand juries reflect a fair
cross-section of the community, a defendant must prove in part 'that the representation of [an allegedly
underrepresented] group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community."' Id. (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364
(1979)). Because the court found the defendant failed to satisfy the second Duren element-that
representation of the distinctive group in the community in venires from which juries are selected is
unfair and unreasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community-the court did not
reach Duren's third element-that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the community is
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Id. at 703 n.6.
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number of Spanish speakers in the Circuit, courts have generated the greatest
amount of law on this issue. Finally, it compares the reasoning and results of fair
cross section cases in these two circuits and concludes that the law as applied in the
First Circuit is unjust.
A. Puerto Rico's Linguistic Landscape
In most states the majority of residents meet the federal jury service
requirements: citizenship, age of majority, no felony record, and English
proficiency.2 6 Even in California, the state with the greatest percentage of Spanish
speakers after Puerto Rico, Spanish speakers represent only approximately one
quarter of the state's population, and although there are no accurate statistics
showing the number of non-citizens living in the state, it is unlikely that they
comprise over half of the population.27 Conversely, eighty percent of Puerto Ricans
identify themselves as unable to communicate effectively in English.2"
As demographics in the United States continue to change, the question of
whether statistically significant underrepresentation on juries of group members
who make up the majority of a state's residents may eventually become relevant to
courts outside the District of Puerto Rico.2 9 Currently, however, Puerto Rico's
situation is unique, requiring different analysis and different results. On the
mainland United States, non-English-speaking children must learn English at
school and often attend special programs to accelerate this process.3" Scholastic
success and, in most instances, the acquisition of gainful employment depend on a
firm grasp of the English language. Most daily transactions, such as banking,
purchasing goods, navigating public transportation systems and roads, and
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (b)(1) (A person is qualified to serve on a grand jury or a petit jury in the
district court unless, among other factors, he "is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who
has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district."); id. § 1865 (b)(5) (A person is qualified
to serve on a grand jury or a petit jury in the district court unless, among other factors, he "has a charge
pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been
restored."); id. § 1865 (b)(2)-(3).
27. ALEJANDRA LOPEZ, STAN. UNIV., CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN RACE AND ET14NICITY
CALIFORNIANS' USE OF ENGLISH AND OTHER LANGUAGES: CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY 1 (2003), available
at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/csre/reports/execsum_ 14.pdf.
28. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Puerto Rico: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"Puerto Rico;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico] (Of the 95.3% of Puerto
Ricans who speak a language other than English at home, 81.2% speak English less than "very well.").
29. Some studies indicate that Hispanics may comprise one in three Americans by the year 2042.
See, e.g., U.S. Minorities Will Be the Majority by 2042, Census Bureau Says, AMERICA.GOV (Aug. 15,
2008), http://www.america.gov/st/peopleplace-english/2008/August/20080815140005xlrennef.107810
6.html. It is difficult to estimate what percentage of this majority might not be jury-eligible due to the
age, English proficiency, and citizenship requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b).
30. For example, in 1998 California passed Proposition 227, the English in Public Schools Initiative
Statute, requiring California public schools to teach "Limited English Proficient" (LEP) students in
special, virtually all-English classes, eliminating previous bilingual ones. Enrollment in an LEP class
was not expected to last for more than a year. Cal. Prop. 227 §1 (1998) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §
305).
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accessing social services, require a high degree of competency in English.
Although there are many insulated communities in the United States, particularly in
larger cities, where social and business interactions occur exclusively in a language
other than English, stepping outside these communities requires some degree of
language assimilation. 31
Puerto Rico's linguistic landscape is precisely the opposite. Although wealthy
Puerto Ricans, particularly those who were born or educated in the continental
United States, often send their children to the island's few private English schools,
the majority of Puerto Rican children receive an education exclusively in Spanish.32
Although an English class is part of most schools' curriculum, without immersion
all but the most exceptional students retain little of what they learn in school. 3
Spanish is the language of the workplace in Puerto Rico. 34 Newspapers, radio,
television, and film are in Spanish (or subtitled in Spanish).35
All Commonwealth legal proceedings take place in Spanish.36 Puerto Rican
law schools teach in Spanish, 37 and the Puerto Rico bar exam is in Spanish. 3
Although English is a requirement for all jobs with the federal government, fluency
varies greatly. Aside from formal court proceedings, which federal law mandates
must take place in English, almost all communication within federal buildings
occurs in Spanish. 39 In the federal courts, defendants, witnesses, and pro se parties
speak to the Spanish-speaking judges and juries in Spanish.40 Lawyers argue in
31. See, e.g., Rob Paral, The Polish Community in Metro Chicago, POLISH AM. Ass'N 12 (June
2004), http://www.robparal.com/downloads/Polish Community in Chicago.pdf (showing the presence of
large, insulated Polish community in Chicago).
32. See 1990 P.R. Laws 68 § 1.02 (West, Westlaw through PR-Legis 3RS 68) ("It is hereby
provided that education shall be imparted in Spanish, the vernacular language. English shall be taught as
a second language.").
33. The situation is similar to the teaching of French in Canada, an officially bilingual country. See
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 16(1) (U.K.) ("English and French are the official languages of Canada and
have equality of equal rights and status and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament
and government of Canada."). Although every Canadian child studies French in school, very few retain
enough of the language to enable them to work or live in French.
34. jAlvarez Gonzilez, supra note 8, at 291.
35. Id. (detailing the dominance of the Spanish language in Puerto Rican media). The English
language paper, The San Juan Star, stopped publishing after almost fifty years in 2009.
36. See People v. Superior Court, 92 P.R. 580, 589-90 (1965) (stating that Spanish is and will
continue to be the language used in judicial proceedings); P.R. R. CRIM. P. 96(d) (requiring criminal
jurors "to read and write the Spanish language"); P.R. R. Civ. P. 8.5 (requiring use of Spanish in
pleadings, motions, petitions and other papers).
37. See, e.g., Requisitos de Admision (Juris Doctor Admission Requirements), PONTIFIC1A
UNtVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE PUERTO Rico, http://207.150.249.35/derecho/index.php?option=comconte
nt&view=article&id=48&Itemid=58&lang-es (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (requiring Spanish and
English fluency for admission to Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico's law school).
38. Preguntas Mcis Frecuentes (Frequently Asked Questions), LA RAMA JUDICIAL DE PUERTO Rico,
http://www.ramajudicial.pr/junta/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). The examinations are written in
Spanish, but can be answered in English or Spanish. Id. (original in Spanish).
39. 48 U.S.C. § 864 ("All pleadings and proceedings in the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English language.").
40. See Jackson v. Garcia, 665 F.2d 395, 396 n.1 (lst Cir. 1981) ("Although I L.P.R.A. § 51,
enacted in 1902, provides that English and Spanish 'shall be used indiscriminately' in the
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varying degrees of English proficiency. An interpreter translates the Spanish
testimony for the benefit of the court reporter, who creates an English transcript.
The reviewing court will base its decision on the English record, but the judge and
jury in the district court inevitably reach their conclusions based on the testimony
they heard in their native tongue. In their chambers, judges communicate with
lawyers, the press, their staff, and their Spanish-speaking clerks in Spanish, and
secretaries and court employees conduct office business in Spanish. A small
number of law clerks and other employees within the federal system, such as
Assistant United States Attorneys, come from the mainland. Puerto Ricans usually
speak English in their presence.
According to the District of Puerto Rico's website, every four years, after an
election, the court randomly selects jurors from certified lists of registered voters.41
The court mails out questionnaires to these individuals explaining the grounds for
both automatic excusal and excusal upon request. 42 The website states that "[m]ost
people that are able to read, write, speak, and understand the English language are
qualified to become jurors."43
A 2006 United States Census Bureau survey reported that 95.3% of Puerto
Rico's population speak a language other than English at home, with 95.2%
speaking Spanish at home. 44 Other states with significant numbers of Spanish
speakers trailed far behind in the percentage who speak a language other than
English at home: 33.7% in Texas,45 35.8% in New Mexico, 46  42.4% in
California, 47 27.9% in Arizona, 4  27.3% in Nevada, 49 25.8% in Florida,50 and
Commonwealth courts, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has interpreted that statute to authorize
Spanish alone, with interpreters when needed...") (citing People v. Superior Court, 92 P.R. at 590);
Gonzales Rose, supra note 22. As of August 2010, there was one native English-speaking judge in the
District of Puerto Rico, Magistrate Judge Bruce McGiverin.
41. Jury Service Information, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF P.R., http://www.prd.uscourts.go
v/courtweb/gpJuryService.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). The selection method accords with the
Federal Jury Service and Selection Act, which designates voter registration lists as the main, but not
exclusive, source of potential juror selection. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2).
42. Automatic excusal applies to active or reserve members of the armed forces, firefighters, police
or law enforcement agents, and public officials in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the
federal, state, or municipal government. Id. Excusal upon request is available to people aged seventy or
over, individuals who have served in the last two years, clergy members, teachers, full time students,
people responsible for the full time care of children under ten or an elderly or handicapped dependent,
practicing physicians or dentists, health services professionals, practicing attorneys, and volunteer safety
personnel in a public agency. Id.
43. Id.
44. Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico, supra note 28.
45. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Texas: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select "Texas;"
follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12,
2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Texas].
46. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: New Mexico: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"New Mexico;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics New Mexico].
47. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: California: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"California;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last
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28.9% in New York.51 The percentage of Puerto Ricans who speak a language
other than English at home who speak English at a level less than "very well," a
fact that likely would exclude them from jury service, was 81.2%.52 For
Californians that number was 19.9%, 53 14.5% for Texans,5 4 13.2% for New
Yorkers,55 13.0% for Nevadans,5 6 12.1% for Arizonans,5 7 11.7% for Floridians,
5 8
and 10.2% for New Mexicans.5 9 Only 39.7% of Puerto Ricans in the labor force
were employed, with 45.3% living below the poverty level. 60 Regarding education,
66.4% of Puerto Ricans twenty five years old and over had at least a high school
degree and 21% had at least a bachelor's degree 6 1-a percentage drastically lower
than the United States' average educational attainment. 62
Conducting court proceedings in English on an island where the vast majority
of participants in the legal system can communicate more effectively in their native
tongue is a manifestation of the colonialist relationship that began when the United
States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain in the Spanish American War in 1898.63
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics California].
48. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Arizona: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"Arizona;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Arizona].
49. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Nevada: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"Nevada;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Nevada].
50. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Florida: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"Florida;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Florida].
51. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: New York: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"New York;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics New York].
52. Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico, supra note 28.
53. Selected Social Characteristics California, supra note 47.
54. Selected Social Characteristics Texas, supra note 45.
55. Selected Social Characteristics New York, supra note 51.
56. Selected Social Characteristics Nevada, supra note 49.
57. Selected Social Characteristics Arizona, supra note 48.
58. Selected Social Characteristics Florida, supra note 50.
59. Selected Social Characteristics New Mexico, supra note 46.
60. Selected Economic Characteristics in the United States: Puerto Rico: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select
"Puerto Rico;" then follow "show more" Economic Characteristics hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12,
2010) [hereinafter Economic Characteristics Puerto Rico].
61. Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico, supra note 28.
62. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://w
ww.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social
Characteristics hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). Nearly eighty-five percent of the U.S. population
age twenty-five and older has attained a high school education or higher, and almost twenty-eight
percent of the U.S. population age twenty-five or older has attained a bachelor's degree or higher. Id.
63. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit Theory: The Case of
Racial Transformation Circa the Spanish American War, 1896-1900, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 921, 927-30
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The First Circuit has justified upholding this tradition by putting the federal justice
system's interest in consistency above the constitutional mandate that parties face a
jury derived from a cross section of their community, and has not considered
alternative means of satisfying the Sixth Amendment, such as translation. 6 A
comparison between the First Circuit's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as applied
to cases arising in Puerto Rico and fair cross section law in other circuits suggests
that this reasoning is not legally sound.
B. Fair Cross Section Challenges in the First Circuit
In 1958, the First Circuit first entertained the question of whether the
systematic exclusion of non-English speakers from federal juries in Puerto Rico
was constitutional. 6 The defendant in Miranda v. United States66 was a Puerto
Rican attorney convicted of subornation of perjury during the trial of three
servicemen he represented in a burglary case. 67 Miranda argued that his indictment
was defective because individuals who could not speak and understand English
were systematically excluded from the grand jury. 68 The court disagreed, holding
that the provision that "all pleadings and proceedings in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English language"
was necessary to the proper functioning of the court.69 The court declared that "it is
reasonable that a court conduct its proceeding in a single language and it is
obviously essential that the judge, the counsel and all the jurors have a working
knowledge of that language if the judicial machinery is to function efficiently."70
The court failed to entertain the idea that, in light of the fact that the judge,
attorneys, and jurors all spoke Spanish, with proficiency in English ranging from
good to poor, conducting proceedings in Spanish would in fact achieve the greatest
efficiency. 7' The court also did not consider any issues beyond efficiency.
(2001) (giving a brief history of the events of the Spanish American War, noting that the United States
"declared Puerto Rico its own as a 'war indemnity"' during treaty negotiations with Spain, and
describing the war's result as "the United States' first step to colonialism").
64. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002) ("It is clear, to the point
of perfect transparency, that federal court proceedings must be conducted in English."); Aponte-Sudrez,
905 F.2d at 491-92 (asserting that the "overwhelming national interest" is served by conducting
proceedings in the District of Puerto Rico in English, which requires jurors to be proficient in English);
Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19-20 (holding that a significant state interest in "having a branch of the national
court system operate in the national language" is advanced by the English proficiency requirement);
Miranda, 255 F.2d at 16 (upholding the reasonableness of juror English-language proficiency
requirement in federal district courts).
65. Miranda, 255 F.2d at 16-17.
66. 255 F. 2d 9 (1st Cir. 1958).
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id. (citing 48 U.S.C. § 864).
70. Id. at 16-17.
71. In 1952 President Truman appointed Clemente Ruiz-Nazario as the first Puerto Rican judge to
serve on the District Court of Puerto Rico. Clemente Ruiz Nazario, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF
P.R., http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/CourtWeb/biosjudgeNazario.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
After that date, all appointed judges were bilingual. See Judges for the United States District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico 1899-Present, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF P.R.,
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In the 1968 case United States v. Valentine,7 2 the District Court of Puerto Rico
faced an attack on the constitutionality of the statutory requirement that
proceedings be conducted in English, the statutory English-language requirement
for jurors, and the failure of grand and petit juries to constitute a cross section of
the community.73 The defendants had been indicted for refusing to submit to
induction into the United States Armed Forces. 74 The court noted Puerto Rico's
unique status as the only "state or territory in which the primary language of a
majority of the American citizens resident therein is other than English."75
Significantly, the court stated that forcing nonresidents to litigate through
interpreters would "compromise[]" and "unreasonably restrict[]" the court's
function of "offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not
subject to local influence. '7 6 The court did not demonstrate similar sympathy for
Puerto Rican residents who, by virtue of the court's decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the statutes,77 have been compelled to litigate virtually all of
their cases through interpreters.
The court viewed the use of Spanish during proceedings as a significant
limitation on the ability of the Attorney General, his staff, and judges from other
districts sitting by designation to participate in judicial proceedings in the district. 78
The court also decried "the strong possibility of injustice through distortion of
meaning in translation" of federal statutes written in English, 79 along with "the
body of law developed throughout the rest of the federal system."80 The court
acknowledged in a footnote that appeals from the Commonwealth required
translation, but dismissed potential injustice arising from distortion of meaning of
those translations with the assertion that "the final judgments of the commonwealth
courts are infrequently subject to federal review, and such review rarely raises
questions whose resolution necessitates a precise parsing of the language appearing
in the record."" t The court likely did not anticipate that, over forty years later, the
federal court would engage in extensive review of Commonwealth cases. Also,
despite noting that the annotated laws of Puerto Rico and its supreme court cases
are translated into English, the court failed to acknowledge the fact that these
http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/CourtWeb/biosintro.aspx#List (pointing out that only Puerto Ricans were
appointed after Judge Nazario); Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d at 5 (proclaiming that judges must conduct
federal court proceedings in English). In 1958, when the First Circuit decided Miranda, the sole district
court judge, the Honorable Clemente Ruiz-Nazario, was a native Spanish speaker. See Clemente Ruiz
Nazario, supra note 71 (noting that a second federal judge for Puerto Rico was not appointed until
1965).
72. 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968).
73. Id. at 961-62.
74. Id. at 961.
75. Id. at 963.
76. Id. at 964 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)).
77. See id. at 963 ("It does not follow, however, that because proceedings in local courts are
conducted in Spanish, proceedings in [federal] court must also be conducted in that language. This court
is not a local court of Puerto Rico. .... [l]t is a United States district court.").
78. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. at 964.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 965.
81. Id. at 964 n.9.
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translations are often poor, and thus of little assistance to federal clerks and judges
conducting review. 2
Declaring a defendant's right to a fair trial to be personal, not collective, the
court stated that it is "no more of a constitutional violation to try non-English
speaking defendants in English in [Puerto Rico's district] court than to try other
non-English speaking defendants in English in any other federal district court." 3
Rejecting the defendants' contention that the English-language requirement
represented an unjust qualification for jury service, the court asserted that there is
no constitutional requirement that "juries be drawn from a cross section of the total
population without the imposition of any qualifications. 's4
In 1981, in United States v. Benmuhar,"5 a Puerto Rican defendant convicted
of arson argued before the First Circuit that the Supreme Court's decision in Duren
v. Missouri6 demanded an outcome different from the result in Miranda8 7 and a
holding that the jury selection process violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
comprised of a fair cross section of the community."s Reversing the Missouri
Supreme Court, Duren held that the systematic exclusion of women from jury
service in Missouri violated the Constitution's fair cross section requirement, as
jury venires included, on average, less than fifteen percent female jurors.8 9 Duren
laid out three factors necessary to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional
jury disproportionality:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process. 90
After a defendant successfully establishes a prima facie case of disproportionality,
the government has the opportunity to show that no constitutional violation has
occurred by demonstrating that the jury qualification "manifestly and primarily"
82. See id at 965 n. 10 (recognizing the availability of English translations of local laws, which the
court contrasted against the poor prospect for Spanish translations of federal laws without making
mention of the quality of the local translations).
83. Id. at 965.
84. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. at 965 (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). Valentine
noted that, traditionally, juries are a representative body of the community drawn from qualified
individuals, denial of jury service on the basis of race-an impermissible qualification-results in the
exclusion of "otherwise qualified groups" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 965 n.13.
85. 658 F.2d 14.
86. 439 U.S. 357.
87. 255 F.2d 9. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71 (discussing Miranda, which held that a
Puerto Rican defendant's indictment was not defective despite the fact that non-English speakers were
excluded from the grand jury, because all federal legal proceedings must be conducted in English).
88. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364).
89. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360.
90. Id. at 364.
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advances a "significant state interest."9'
Although the First Circuit did not explore this issue, the second prong of this
test leaves open the question of whether representation should be measured by
comparing the number of group members in jury venires with the number of group
members in the community as a whole, or solely with jury-eligible group members.
In a district completely made up of group members, such as Spanish speakers in
Puerto Rico, this distinction is simply not relevant.
The Court did discuss the potential exclusion of some group members from
the statistical analysis, however, as it pertained to the ultimate inquiry into whether
a constitutional violation occurred, as opposed to the initial establishment of a
prima facie case. The Court noted that "[s]tates remain free to prescribe relevant
qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it
may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the
community."9  Nonetheless, where a significant state interest in their
implementation provides "adequate justification," these exemptions may result in
disproportionate exclusion that passes constitutional muster. 93 Missouri suggested,
but failed to demonstrate, that other exemptions furthering significant state
interests, such as those for individuals over age sixty-five, teachers, and
government workers, caused the underrepresentation. The state's failure to offer
any substantial justification for the underrepresentation of women on juries led the
Court to believe that the exclusion of women resulted from the systematic
application of their automatic exemption. 94
In Benmuhar, the defendant identified nine distinctive groups that he claimed
did not have fair and reasonable representation on Puerto Rican juries: San Juan
area residents; women; professional-managerial white collar workers; industrial
farming and fishing workers; unemployed and/or retired housewives; people with
eighth grade or lower educations; people with more than a high school education;
whites; and blacks.9 The defendant attributed all of this alleged disproportionality
to the English-language requirement. 96 Applying the Duren test and the reasoning
of Valentine, the court held that the English-language requirement primarily and
manifestly advanced the government's significant interest in "having a branch of
the national court system operate in the national language."97
Although the court upheld the requirement, it labeled its judgment "a narrow
one" and expressed no opinion "as to the ability of Congress to achieve different
results through legislation or as to a case in which the appellant identified and the
government did not respond to policy accommodations that could achieve the
national language interest without the need for such an English proficiency
91. Id. at 367-68.
92. Id. at 367 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
93. Id. at 371.
94. Id. at 368-69 ("Assuming, arguendo, that the exemptions mentioned by the court below would
justify failure to achieve a fair community cross section on jury venires, the State must demonstrate that
these exemptions caused the underrepresentation complained of.").
95. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19 n.2.
96. Id. at 19 (arguing that "systematic exclusion" is the result of the only "systematic"
characteristic-the requirement to be proficient in English either in reading and writing, or speaking).
97. Id. at 19-20.
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requirement for jurors. 98 Despite Benmuhar's narrow holding, however, the First
Circuit applied it to a new challenge to the composition of grand and petit juries
nine years later. 99
The defendants in United States v. Aponte-Surez'00 argued that their
indictment was defective because the grand and petit jurors lacked proficiency in
English and sought to prove that English proficiency among Puerto Ricans had
declined to such an extent that this decline created an adverse effect on Puerto
Rican federal juries. 101 The court applied the Duren test,0 2 concluding that even if
the defendants proved the existence of a smaller pool of eligible jurors and
systematic exclusion in the jury selection process, "the overwhelming national
interest served by the use of English in a United States court justifies conducting
proceedings in the District of Puerto Rico in English and requiring jurors to be
proficient in that language."' 13
The First Circuit followed Aponte-Surrez in United States v. Flores-Rivera, 1 4
dismissing the defendant's contention that the exclusion of two-thirds of Puerto
Rico's population from federal jury duty violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. 105 In 2002, in response to a suggestion that Puerto Rico's district court
provide simultaneous translation to prevent exclusion of the poor from the petit
juror pool, the First Circuit rejected the defendants' contention that Benmuhar
relied on the fact that its defendants did not propose any viable alternatives to the
current system.0 6 In the same year, the First Circuit declared that "[i]t is clear, to
the point of perfect transparency, that federal court proceedings must be conducted
in English."' 1 7 Analyzing a challenge to the introduction into evidence of Spanish
transcripts based on the district court's finding that the English translations were
inaccurate, the court pronounced that "[t]he policy interest in keeping the District
of Puerto Rico as an integrated part of the federal judiciary is too great to allow
parties to convert that court into a Spanish language court at their whim."' 1° It
further explained:
98. Id. at 20.
99. Aponte-Sudrez, 905 F.2d at 492 n.4 (citing § 1865(b)(2)-(3) for the position that federal law
requires grand and petit jurors both to speak English and to possess the reading, writing, and
comprehension skills necessary to complete a juror qualification form).
100. 905 F.2d 483.
101. Id. at 491-92 (noting that the defendants supported this position with "newspaper accounts
claiming a decline in English proficiency among the general population of Puerto Rico").
102. See supra text accompanying note 90 (quoting the Duren test).
103. Id. at 492 (citing Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19).
104. 56 F.3d 319 (lst Cir. 1995).
105. Id. at 326; see also United States v. Escobar-de Jesfis, 187 F.3d 148, 166 (1st Cir. 1999)
(treating the challenge to the constitutionality of the English requirement for jurors as having been
decided in Aponte-Sudrez just as Flores-Rivera did).
106. United States v. Dub6n-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (concluding that the national
language interest, and not the lack of any viable alternative, justifies conducting proceedings only in
English in the District Court of Puerto Rico (citing Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d at 326)).
107. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d at 5.
108. Id. at 5, 8 n.9.
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With a disturbing frequency, district courts in Puerto Rico have
allowed parties to offer briefs, documents, and testimony in Spanish
without translation. Though we recognize that most jurors, and even
judges, in Puerto Rico may be more comfortable speaking in Spanish
than in English, district courts must be faithfully committed to the
English-language requirement. If not, the District of Puerto Rico
risks disassociating itself from the rest of the federal judiciary. More
importantly, appellate courts cannot properly review district court
convictions on the basis of translations, later claimed as evidence,
that were neither read nor heard by the jury. 09
More recently, rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim based on a defendant's
contention that public-housing residents have been systematically excluded from
Puerto Rico federal juries, the First Circuit reasserted the validity of the English-
language requirement based on "the overwhelming national interest served by the
use of English in a United States court." 0 In spite of Puerto Rico's unique
demographics rendering the effects of disproportionality more extreme than in any
other district that has contemplated similar challenges, the First Circuit's
commitment to upholding the constitutionality of the English-language requirement
has become increasingly entrenched.
C. Fair Cross Section Challenges in the Ninth Circuit
Other circuit and district courts located in areas with large Spanish-speaking
communities have faced similar challenges by defendants alleging unconstitutional
underrepresentation of Spanish speakers, or "Hispanics," on the juries they
faced. I"' In these cases, the English-language requirement, though often comprising
one factor in the analysis, has not been the sole concern. In communities made up
largely of immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries such as Mexico, other jury
qualifications, such as United States citizenship, have caused courts to grapple with
the question of whether the analysis under Duren's second prong, seeking to
determine if representation is "fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community,""' 2 should be based on the total number of community
members or the subset of eligible jurors within that community.' The Ninth
109. Id. at 20-21; see also United States v. Gonzdlez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9, 18 n.3 (lst Cir. 1997)
(stating that the use of English is necessary for the creation of an appellate record because appellate
judges do not have the benefit of an official translator enjoyed by district court judges).
110. Gonzdlez-Vlez, 466 F.3d at 38, 40 (quoting Aponte-Surrez, 905 F.2d at 492).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Artero argues that the
grand jury that indicted him was not a fair cross section of the population, because it underrepresented
persons of Hispanic ethnicity."); Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d at 702 ("[Torres-Hernandez] argued that,
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the systematic exclusion of Hispanics in Southern District of
California grand jury venires had resulted in a grand jury that did not represent a fair cross-section of the
community.").
112. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
113. See, e.g., Artero, 121 F.3d at 1261-62 ("If Hispanics in Imperial and San Diego Counties were
less likely than others to be citizens, then non-citizenship rather than systematic exclusion of qualified
individuals would explain both lower percentages of registered voters and lower representation in the
jury wheel."). The fact that these issues arise in the context of immigrant communities also accounts for
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Circuit has generated the greatest amount of law on this issue, ultimately denying
every fair cross section challenge it considered based on the conclusion that only
jury-eligible members are relevant to the analysis and the challengers' inability to
establish unconstitutional underrepresentation grounded in the resulting statistical
comparison. 114
In United States v. Esquivel,I" the defendant, charged with bringing an illegal
alien into the United States, challenged the partiality of the jury based on the fair
cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment 16 and the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'17 The court agreed with the government
that, to establish a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation under Duren's
second prong, the relevant Hispanic community with which the percentage of
Hispanics on the jury should be compared, should include only jury-eligible
community members. 118 Calculating the number of Hispanic citizens in the
Southern District of California over eighteen years of age according to census data
significantly reduced the total relevant population, rendering the defendant unable
to establish an unconstitutional disparity. '"
The next year, in United States v. Artero,120 the defendant, convicted of
smuggling marijuana across the border and possession with intent to distribute,
challenged the representation of Hispanics on the grand jury that indicted him.'2 '
Noting that the Southern District of California judges had stated that the two
counties comprising the district, both of which bordered Mexico, "would likely
have many Hispanic residents who had not yet attained citizenship or English
proficiency, because they had only recently come to the United States," the Ninth
the use of the word "Hispanic" to describe a racial/ethnic category, as opposed to "Spanish speaker,"
which, in Puerto Rico, differentiates potential jurors solely on the basis of their language skills.
114. See, e.g., Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d at 701-02 ("We hold that, to determine whether Hispanics
are underrepresented to an unconstitutional degree in venires, a district court must rely on that evidence
which most accurately reflects the judicial district's actual percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics.
Because the district court here used the most accurate data presented to it by the parties-data that
excluded segments of the Hispanic population ineligible for jury service-we affirm Torres-
Hemandez's conviction and sentence.").
115. 88 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 1996).
116. Id. at 724-26.
117. Id. at 727. Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the grand jury selection process are analyzed
according to the standard set forth in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Id. at 725. To
establish a prima facie case under Castaneda, an appellant may demonstrate discrimination in jury
selection by showing: (1) that he/she is part of a recognizable, distinct class, (2) underrepresentation
exists by measuring the size of the group in the general population against the size of the group called to
serve as grand jurors over a significant period of time. Id. (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494).
118. Id. at 726-27 (concluding that in order to calculate the statistical data required to prove the
second prong of the Duren test-that the jury pool is an inaccurate representation of the community-
the court limits the general population pool to those eligible to serve on juries by taking judicial notice
of 1990 census data showing the number of jury-eligible individuals).
119. Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727; Artero, 121 F.3d at 1261 ("Once the category of Hispanics was
narrowed down to those Hispanics eligible to serve on juries, the disparity dropped from the defense
claim of 14.5% to 4.9%."). The Esquivel court assumed that all of these individuals had sufficient
fluency in English to qualify for jury service. Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727.
120. 121 F.3d 1256.
121. Id. at 1257, 1260.
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Circuit concluded that "the percentage of Hispanics eligible for federal jury service
in those two counties was likely to be lower than the ratio for the general
population." 122 The court rejected the defendant's expert's testimony regarding the
likely Hispanic population of the counties because the demographer did not answer
the "right question" of "whether Hispanics eligible to serve on federal juries were
unreasonably underrepresented because of systematic exclusion."'123
Acknowledging Duren's failure to make this distinction, the court commented
that, "in Duren, there was no reason to doubt the usefulness of comparing the
percentage of women summoned for jury service to the percentage in the district,
because there is no reason to think women would be disproportionately ineligible to
serve on juries."'124 The court contrasted this situation with that of immigrants in
border counties and ports of entry, explaining that "[i]t took many of our ancestors
a while to learn English and become citizens."'' 25 The court also announced that, in
reaching its conclusion, it was following the Fifth Circuit's holding in United States
v. Fike126 that "the pertinent inquiry is the pool of [members of the relevant group]
in the district who are eligible to serve as jurors."'127
Eight years later, in United States v. Rodriguez-Lara,2 8 the Ninth Circuit
reached a different conclusion. 12 9 Charged with being a deported alien found in the
United States, and appearing pro se, the defendant moved to dismiss his indictment
based on the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the jury pool of the Fresno
Division of the Eastern District of California and sought appointment of a
demographic expert to assist him in developing this claim. 130 The district court
denied the motion, holding that, based on evidence submitted by the government,
the defendant could not demonstrate underrepresentation in relation to "the subset
of the population meeting all the federal juror-eligibility requirements." 131
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's use of the jury-eligible
population as the measure of comparison to establish a prima facie case.
Emphasizing Duren's use of the word "community" without modification and the
Court's subsequent reiteration of this standard in Teague v. Lane,'32 the court stated
122. Id. at 1261.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 1262 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 365-66).
125. Id. at 1262.
126. 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled by United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.
1998).
127. Artero, 121 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Fike, 82 F.3d at 1321 (analyzing representation of African-
Americans on a venire panel under Duren)). Courts in other districts have reached similar conclusions.
See, e.g., Silva v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 8:06-cv-2257-T-I 7TBM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102759, at
*17 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10. 2008) (stating that "any claim of under-representation would still require an
accounting of such factors as citizenship, prior felony conviction, as well as the ability to speak and
understand English.").
128. 421 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2005).
129. See id. at 947 (finding the district court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's
motion to appoint an expert to establish his Sixth Amendment cross section claim in light of the strength
of the showing the defendant established even without an expert).
130. Id. at 937-38.
131. Id. at938.
132. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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that the "weight of Supreme Court and circuit authority teaches that, for purposes
of the prima facie case, the proportion of the distinctive group in the jury pool is to
be compared with the proportion of the group in the whole community." '133 The
court distinguished Esquivel on the grounds that, in Esquivel, the record contained
population data broken down by age, then acknowledged a conflict in the circuit
between the line of cases it cited to support its position and Artero, as well as a
decision following Artero, Sanders v. Woodford. 3 4 The court dismissed Artero as
wrongly decided, identified a Ninth Circuit case decided eight years before Artero,
United States v. Sanchez-Lopez,35 as binding authority on the issue, and held that a
defendant's prima facie case for a fair cross section claim may rely on a
comparison to total population data or, where available in the record, age-eligible
population data. 13 6 The court bolstered its holding with its view that requiring
defendants to sort out from the general population figures the number of
individuals not fluent in English would impose a potentially insuperable burden on
fair cross section claimants. 37
The Ninth Circuit resolved the conflict between Artero and Rodriguez-Lara in
United States v. Torres-Hernandez3 8 when it held that a district court need not and
may not take into account Hispanics who are ineligible for jury service to
determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on grand jury venires.'3 9 To
support this ruling, the court relied on Esquivel's principle that "[w]hen presented
with various types of data to determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on
grand jury venires, a court must rely on the statistical data that best approximates
the percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics in the district."' 40 In light of both Artero's
and Rodriguez-Lara's approval of Esquivel, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning appears
sound. 141
133. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 941 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 n.21, 365 n.23, and Teague, 489
U.S. at 301 n.1). The court also found related support in Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495-96, Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970), and Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 627 (1972). Rodriguez-
Lara, 421 F.3d at 941.
134. Id. at 942-43 (citing Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 726-27, Artero, 121 F.3d at 1261-62, and Sanders v.
Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'don other grounds, Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S.
212 (2006)); see also Sanders, 373 F.3d at 1069-70 (faulting the defendant's expert for "his assumption
that every adult Hispanic person in Kern County who was not a legal, registered immigrant from Mexico
was a jury-eligible United States citizen," which likely "substantially overstated" the
underrepresentation of Hispanics in the jury venire).
135. 879 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1989).
136. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 943. Rodriguez-Lara relies on Sanchez-Lopez's discussion of
Castaneda's acceptance of total population figures to establish a prima facie case of an equal protection
violation and on Sanchez-Lopez's interpretation of Duren to "suggest[]" that where the government does
not present evidence to challenge a defendant's statistics, it could assume that the statistics were valid.
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 547.
137. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 943 n.9.
138. 447 F.3d 699.
139. Id. at 701.
140. Id. at 704.
141. See Artero, 121 F.3d at 1260-61 (approving of Esquivel's rule that the relevant consideration in
a fair cross section challenge to Hispanic jury representation is the number of jury-eligible Hispanics in
the district); Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 942 (citing Esquivel to support the conclusion that defendants
may not rely on statistical data reflecting the total population when more refined data on the jury-eligible
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Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit never analyzed a fair cross section challenge
on its merits due to defendants' consistent failure to establish a prima facie case. If
the court had held that a constitutional violation occurred, it could have easily
remedied the situation by assembling a new and more representative jury, simply
by drawing on more group members in the community, of which there would
presumably be a sufficient number of jury-eligible individuals. This solution is not
available in the District of Puerto Rico. Absent a legal remedy for the differential
treatment, the imposition of federal law in the territory becomes questionable. Part
II explores this dilemma further by examining the District of Puerto Rico's
manipulation of federal and constitutional law to mete out justice to a minority it
identified as the island's English speakers.
II. A CASE STUDY
As explored above, most federal law is based on an underlying assumption
that United States citizens are, or should be, English-speaking. As a result, couris'
interpretations of federal and constitutional law as applied to Puerto Rico may be
convoluted and even entirely inapposite to plain or well-established meaning.
Diffenderfer, a 2008 District of Puerto Rico case concerning voters' rights,
illustrates this problem well. 142 This Part dissects the Diffenderfer opinion and
explains how the case reflects another dimension of the conflict between language,
statutory, and constitutional rights.
In Diffenderfer, plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action suit on
behalf of "eligible voters in Puerto Rico who do not speak Spanish" against the
state election commission and its four commissioners seeking an injunction that
would require the commission to print bilingual ballots in Spanish and English for
the highly contentious 2008 gubernatorial election. 143 According to the 2000
census, the number of affected voters was approximately 362,000 out of the
island's population of approximately four million, or nine percent. 44 Ruling in
plaintiffs' favor, the district court held that Spanish-only ballots violated the Voting
Rights Act (VRA), the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the First Amendment. 145
The VRA provides that no standard, practice, or procedure "shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority
group.' ' 14
6 Rights protected under this statute include casting a ballot, and having
such ballot counted properly.147 The critical question in a claim arising under the
population is available).
142. See Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 345, 347, 350 (construing federal and constitutional laws to
protect the Puerto Rican "English-monolingual community" as a language minority group that is similar
to a national, ethnic, or racial minority group and comprises a significant percentage of the eligible
voters in Puerto Rico).
143. Id. at 341-42.
144. Id. at 341 n.2.
145. Id. at 343.
146. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (2006).
147. Id. § 19731(c)(1).
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VRA "is whether the use of a contested electoral practice or structure results in
members of a protected group having less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process[.J' 148 The VRA also specifically
prohibits the use of English-only ballots where more than five percent of the
citizens of voting age belong to a minority language group. 149 For purposes of the
VRA, the term "language minorities" or "language minority group" means persons
who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish
heritage.15 0
Diffenderfer acknowledged that, in light of the VRA's specificity about
qualifying linguistic minorities, the court could not apply the statute according to
its explicit terms."' Nonetheless, deferring to the Supreme Court's instruction in
Chisom v. Roemer"' that the VRA "should be interpreted in a manner that provides
'the broadest possible scope' in combating discrimination," the court decided "to
look to the spirit and the intent of the law" and accordingly held that Spanish-only
ballots violated section two of the VRA.153 Stating that the existence of an English-
monolingual minority group was "clearly not contemplated by Congress," the court
chose to write this group into the VRA, adding a fifth group to the definition of
language minorities. 15 4
Diffenderfer alternatively held that a Spanish-only ballot system discriminates
against Plaintiffs on the basis of their national origin, ethnicity, and/or race in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55 Courts
analyze racial classifications imposed by a government entity under strict scrutiny,
requiring the classification to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government interest.'56 Other classifications are subject to rational basis review,
requiring the regulation to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 7 The
Diffenderfer court held that the decision to print ballots only in Spanish failed to
survive either level of review. 5 s
Strict scrutiny applies not only to racial classifications, but also to
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, when the burden on this right is
severe.' 59 Diffenderfer based its strict scrutiny analysis on its assertion that the
English-only ballot system encompassed both racial discrimination and a threat to
148. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (plurality opinion).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3).
150. Id. § 19731(c)(3).
151. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
152. 501 U.S. 380(1991).
153. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (quoting Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (holding that "all racial classifications
[imposed by the government] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." (quoting
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))) (emphasis added).
157. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976)) (discussing the deferential, or rational basis, standard of review for non-suspect
classifications).
158. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
159. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005) ("Instead, as our cases since Tashjian have
clarified, strict scrutiny is appropriate only if the burden is severe.").
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voting rights, concluding that under those circumstances, the defendants need not
prove intentional discrimination. 60 The court briefly discussed the history of anti-
American sentiment on the island, and explained that the "use of English is
frequently identified with natives of the continental United States, as a distinct
national category apart from native-born Puerto Ricans .... ,, '6 The court then
drew the conclusion that, "in the context of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
membership in a linguistic group is essentially identical to a national, ethnic, or
even racial classification," making strict scrutiny appropriate. 62 There is little
precedent for this pronouncement. Stating that the defendants had not put forth any
compelling interests to justify the existing ballot system, the court held that
Spanish-only elections did not withstand strict scrutiny. 63
The court also determined that Spanish-only ballots would not survive the
highly deferential rational basis test because the defendants justified the Spanish-
only ballots based on the impracticality and high cost of creating new ones within
the tight deadline before the election. 164 The court rejected this argument, based on
testimony from the printer contracted to make the ballots that he could in fact create
bilingual ballots in time. 165 Even if the paper stock that was ordinarily used was
unavailable, the court saw no reason that the printer could not obtain other suitable
stock. 166
Finally, the court analyzed the Spanish-only ballots under the First
Amendment. Describing the complexity of the ballot instructions, the court
declared that "[r]equiring non-Spanish speakers to navigate these ballots entirely in
Spanish effectively limits the political participation of a significant percentage of
Puerto Rico's eligible voters."'167 The court also noted, however, that the ballots
were likely to create confusion among Spanish speakers as well, as demonstrated
by a heated dispute over contested ballots in the 2004 election. 168 Relying on the
First Circuit's holding that "federal intervention into a state election was
appropriate where a significant percentage of the qualified and voting electorate
was, in effect, denied its vote," the court implied that the defendants had substantial
First Amendment interests at stake by summarizing the many different methods of
marking the ballot and the many different sets of instructions for voting for each
office.'69 The court again examined the defendants' proffered reasons for the
Spanish-only ballot, increased costs and the difficulty of meeting the printing
deadline before the election. 70 Dismissing these logistical reasons for the second
160. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (citing Coalition for Educ. v. Bd. of Elections, 370 F. Supp.
42, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
161. Id. at 347.
162. Id.
163. See id. ("The Spanish-only ballot system clearly does not withstand strict scrutiny. Defendants
have proposed no compelling interests which Spanish-only elections serve to protect.").
164. Id. at 347-48.
165. Id. at 348.
166. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 348.
167. Id. at 350.
168. Id. at 349 n.10 (citing Rossell6-GonzAlez v. Calder6n-Serra, 398 F.3d 1, 4-7 (1st Cir. 2004)).
169. Id. at 349 (quoting Calderrn-Serra, 398 F.3d at 16); id. at 349-50.
170. Id. at 350.
[Vol. 20:1
time, the court held that "[t]he increase in cost alone does not justify a substantial
burden on Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to express themselves by voting" and
declared the Spanish-only ballots unconstitutional.'71
The election commission complied with the injunction by printing bilingual
ballots,' and in April 2009 the district court ordered the defendants to pay the
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 73 The defendants appealed both the underlying decision
and the award of attorneys' fees. 7 4 While the appeal was pending, Puerto Rico
enacted Law No. 90, mandating the use of bilingual ballots in all future Puerto
Rican elections, Law No. 90 rendering the appeal on the merits moot. 75
The First Circuit vacated the district court's opinion "because it was rendered
moot by an independent, intervening act of legislation."'' 76 It also ruled that,
because the plaintiffs successfully obtained the relief they sought in the district
court, they remained prevailing parties for purposes of attorneys' fees, 177 and
affirmed the fees award without examining the merits of the case. 78
The timing of the passage of Law No. 90 and the First Circuit's subsequent
ruling likely afforded the plaintiffs a windfall. Although the district court's decision
was fair, the court lacked the authority to reach its result under the statutes and
constitutional principles it invoked. It is therefore highly unlikely that the opinion
would have survived First Circuit review on the merits. As the court acknowledged,
the VRA does not cover individuals in the plaintiffs' unique position. 179
Specifically, the court stated that Puerto Rico is not a covered jurisdiction under
section four of the Act, which forbids certain jurisdictions from denying any citizen
the right to vote based on any test or device, including language-based
instruments. 8 ° It further noted that section two is equally unavailing because the
Act does not include English speakers in its definition of a language minority.'8 '
The VRA could therefore not support an order to print bilingual ballots.
In its Equal Protection analysis, Diffenderfer cited only one case to support its
proposition that "in the context of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, membership
in a linguistic group is essentially identical to a national, ethnic, or even racial
classification" and that, therefore, it was appropriate to apply strict scrutiny to the
election commission's refusal to print bilingual ballots." 2 Without precedent to
171. Diffenderfer, 587 F.Supp. 2d at 350.
172. Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Col6n, 587 F.3d 445,450 (1st Cir. 2009).
173. Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Col6n, 606 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230 (D.P.R. 2009).
174. Diffenderfer, 587 F.3d at 449.
175. Id.
176. Id. at451.
177. See id. at 454 ("They not only obtained the injunctive relief they sought. They also obtained the
desired practical outcome of their suit through the operation of that injunction: the Commission in fact
distributed bilingual ballots in the November 2008 elections." (footnote omitted)).
178. See id. ("We recognize that the defendant did not have the chance to seek to reverse the court's
injunction on appeal on the ground that it was based on an error of law.").
179. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
180. Id. at 344.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 347. But see id. ("In Puerto Rico, use of English is frequently identified with natives of the
continental United States, as a distinct national category apart from native-born Puerto Ricans, for whom
Spanish remains their mother tongue."); id. ("Because the policy burdens the rights of monolingual
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establish the application of strict scrutiny under these circumstances, only the
court's rational basis review was proper.' 83 Under rational basis review, the
commission's decision was valid unless it bore no rational relationship to its
legitimate interests. ,84 One of the proffered reasons for the commission's decision,
heightened costs, rationally relates to its interest in conducting elections at the least
possible expense, and would therefore likely survive rational basis review upon
appeal.
Finally, the court's First Amendment analysis relied on the fact that the Puerto
Rican election ballot "is complex and difficult to understand."' 85 The court
described four methods of voting (straight, mixed, candidate, and write-in), and
three different types of ballots (governor and resident commissioner, state
legislature, and municipal legislature), each of which comes with a different set of
instructions. 8 6 The result of this elaborate voting scheme, the court concluded, was
that "requiring non-Spanish speakers to navigate these ballots entirely in Spanish
effectively limits the political participation of a significant percentage" of Puerto
Rican voters."5 7 The fact that the ballots presented equivalent obstacles to
communicating Spanish voters' intentions, however, weakens the court's language-
based arguments and suggests that a challenge to the overall presentation of the
ballots, in a different context, would be a more appropriate method to resolve this
particular problem.
The merits of the Diffenderfer plaintiffs' claims and the court's opinion are
moot, but the legal contortions in which the court engaged to reach its desired result
leave a lasting impression. The necessity of rewriting a statute and creating a new
Equal Protection category stems from the same problem identified in the fair cross
section analysis above. The proper application of constitutional and federal law in
Puerto Rico does not lead to equitable outcomes.
CONCLUSION
Language is at the heart of the debate concerning Puerto Rico's relationship
with the United States. 8' Faced with the choice between giving Puerto Rico
English speakers to vote on the basis of their nationality and/or race, strict scrutiny is appropriate."
(citing Coal. for Educ., 370 F. Supp. at 55)).
183. The Supreme Court has stated that "[it may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some
communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate
for race under an equal protection analysis." Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991)
(plurality opinion). The First Circuit may have held that this was one of those cases.
184. See N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 n.39 (1979) ("[Llegislative
classifications are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State's objectives. State
legislation 'does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications [it makes]
are imperfect."' (quoting Wash. v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501-02 (1979)) (citations
omitted)).
185. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
186. Id. at 349-50.
187. Id. at 350.
188. For an excellent discussion of the effect of language issues on the relations between Puerto Rico
and the United States, and the impact of language on Puerto Rico's possibility of attaining statehood, see
generally Jos6 Julidn Alvarez GonzAlez, Law, Language, and Statehood: The Role of English in the
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independence and embracing it as a full state, the American government has
adopted a third option-a Commonwealth status that likely no one envisioned
would last over a hundred years." 9 A 1998 referendum conducted on the island
determined Puerto Ricans' position regarding their relationship with the United
States. When faced with a choice between statehood and independence, 50.3% of
the voters selected "none of the above," 46.5% voted for statehood, and 2.5% voted
for independence. 19 In similar referenda conducted in 1967 and 1993, Puerto
Ricans chose the option to retain their current political status over both statehood
and independence.191 In 2009, Puerto Ricans elected as governor Luis G. Fortufto,
Acevedo Vild's rival. 92 The election of a pro-statehood governor was accompanied
by a push for a new referendum, one that some believe might finally result in a
majority vote for statehood. 93 These referenda, however, are non-binding, and any
future change to Puerto Rico's status will require Congressional approval. 194
The imposition of English as the official language on this Spanish-speaking
island that would almost certainly accompany a transition from Commonwealth to
state would wreak havoc on all of Puerto Rico's institutions and present a logistical
nightmare. The alternative, allowing a state to function in a language other than
English, would pose another substantial set of challenges. Both the present situation
and possible statehood thus relegate the island to a status of linguistic colonialism,
a problem to which no solution, save independence, presents itself. Any other
option deprives Puerto Ricans of either their language and culture, or certain
fundamental constitutional and statutory rights. 95
There are myriad and complex explanations for the United States' reluctance
to relinquish its ownership of Puerto Rico. These include a desire to control the
Great State ofPuerto Rico, 17 LAW & INEQ. 359 (1999),
189. Cf ALEXANDER ODISHELIDZE & ARTHUR LAFFER, PAY TO THE ORDER OF PUERTO RicO 60
(2004) ("Puerto Rico is neither a nation nor a state. It occupies a shadow-land, a kind of Limbo, where
each and every aspect of its affairs, from law enforcement, to banking, to citizenship, to federal program
eligibility, to taxation, is handled in a way peculiar to the island and its unique history.").
190. Josd Trias Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View of the
Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 19 (1999).
191. Dwyer Arce, U.S. House Approves Puerto Rico Status Referendum Bill, JURIST (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2010/04/us-house-approves-bill-on-puerto-rico.php (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010).
192. Damien Cave, Puerto Rico Governor Promises Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A28.
Acevedo Vili was acquitted of all the charges against him in March 2009, after he lost the election for
governor to Fortufio. Damien Cave & Omaya Sosa-Pascual, Puerto Rico Ex-Governor is Acquitted of
Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at A13
193. See Arce, supra note 191 ("[A bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in April 2010]
would establish a two-step referendum, the first of which would ask voters in Puerto Rico whether they
wanted to change the status of the island. If the option to change the island's status won, a second
referendum would be held, giving voters the option of statehood, independence, 'sovereignty in
association with the United States,' or maintaining the present status. Puerto Rican Governor Luis
Fortufio (R), along with the leaders of the territorial legislature, have expressed their support for the bill
and eventual statehood.").
194. Id.
195. Cf. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Bringing Democracy to Puerto Rico: A Rejoinder, 11 HARV. LATINO
L. REV. 157, 160-63 (2008) (summarizing and criticizing arguments in favor of granting Puerto Rico
representation in Congress without necessarily becoming a state).
Fall 20 10]
island's resources and to maintain a supply of fresh military personnel to fight in its
overseas wars, and the tax breaks enjoyed by the major American pharmaceutical
companies on the island.196 Puerto Ricans, in turn, have ample reasons to desire a
strong connection to the United States, including annual injections of federal funds
and massive job creation by the federal government.'97 Puerto Ricans must weigh
these benefits with the potential loss of their linguistic and cultural identity, while
the United States grapples with possible challenges to its language laws if a change
in Puerto Rico's status results in mass migration or immigration to the mainland.
These issues do not lend themselves to easy resolution. But it is clear that
Puerto Ricans should not have to struggle for basic legal rights such as a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community and the ability to communicate in their
own language in their courts. To this end, while the question of Puerto Rico's status
remains pending, the United States should implement changes in the law that would
lead to a more equitable system. '91
To ensure that the District of Puerto Rico complies with the Sixth Amendment
and its statutory equivalent, Congress should amend the Jury Service and Selection
Act to exempt Puerto Rico from the English-language requirement for federal
jurors. Puerto Rico's district courts should function bilingually, with federal
provision of interpretation into either Spanish or English for all parties, witnesses,
attorneys, court reporters, clerks, judges, and observers. The transition to a
bilingual court would be relatively simple due to the fact that the infrastructure for
interpretation is already in place. To facilitate proceedings in Spanish, the court
would, in most cases, need only to interpret the record from Spanish to English for
the First Circuit's use on appeal. To continue the existing proceedings in English
but allow monolingual Spanish speakers to serve as jurors, the court could provide
interpretation to jurors through the same mechanism currently in place to translate
the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses and give Spanish-speaking defendants
and parties simultaneous translation.
This is not an entirely radical proposition, as a United States court currently
operates bilingually. New Mexico state courts provide translation for Spanish jurors
to ensure that all members of the community may serve on a jury. 199Their system
196. See ODISHELIDZE, supra note 189, at 61 ("[I]ndustries on the island, particularly U.S.
pharmaceutical companies, have enjoyed a targeted tax break that essentially relieved them of all U.S.
corporate income tax on their earnings there."); DICK THORNBURGH, PUERTO RiCo's FUTURE: A TIME
TO DECIDE 6 (2007) (stating that Puerto Rico bears special military significance for the United States,
being its southernmost military "stronghold" and ranking "alongside the top five U.S. states in per capita
military service."); cf Ediberto Romin, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto
Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1150 n.139 (1997) ("The United States acquired direct control over Puerto
Rico to 'provide uninhibited access to its territory, its resources and even its people for military
purposes."' (quoting Efrdn Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The
Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 225, 316 (1996))).
197. See ODISHELIDZE, supra note 189, at 59-75 (providing figures and statistics on U.S. spending on
Puerto Rico in various fields, including housing, nutrition assistance, education, transportation and
vocational training).
198. For a thorough discussion of recommendations to convert the District of Puerto Rico into a fully
bilingual court, see Gonzales Rose, supra note 22.
199. Id.
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works well and has not generated complaints of inaccuracy or inefficiency.2 °°
Additionally, federal courts have long allowed translation for deafjurors.20
Another potential benefit of a bilingual court would be that greater
participation in the federal judiciary would increase Puerto Ricans' investment in
the system and reduce hostility that has historically manifested itself in violent
protests and other forms of resistance, including the attempted shooting of First
Circuit Judge Juan Torruella.20 2 Some Puerto Ricans already recognize certain
advantages to the presence of the federal court, such as a plethora of high-paid jobs
and the ability to shift the burden of prosecuting drug crimes from the
Commonwealth courts. To others, the federal court represents the most oppressive
aspect of Puerto Rico's colonial status because the court has the unchecked power
to impose lengthy sentences that defendants must serve in federal prisons. The
United States' attempt to seek the death penalty against some defendants has been a
source of continuous controversy, as it flies in the face of Puerto Rico's clear
constitutional mandate that "the death penalty should not exist."2 3
In addition to amending the Jury Service and Selection Act to allow for
bilingual federal courts on the island, Congress should incorporate protections for
minority English speakers into the Voting Rights Act and amend Title VII to
protect individuals in Puerto Rico from discrimination based on language.2°4 For its
part, when faced with future constitutional and statutory challenges, the federal
judiciary should strive, with flexibility and creativity, to balance national interests
with Puerto Rican rights without sacrificing either, even if the result is a different
rule for the Commonwealth than the one applicable to the incorporated states. To
maintain the integrity of American law and the dignity of Puerto Rico's citizens,
the United States should act swiftly and decisively to conform federal law to the
realities of Puerto Rico and end linguistic colonialism.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See e.g., Thousands Mark Island's Status as Commonwealth, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 26,
2006, at A6 (reporting that on the fifty-fourth anniversary of Puerto Rico's status as a U.S.
Commonwealth, supporters of Puerto Rico's independence gathered with pro-independence speeches,
protests, and egg-throwing); 5 Women Sentenced in Vieques Bombing Protest, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 11,
2002, at A18 (reporting that members of Puerto Rico's pro-independence party did not defend federal
trespassing charges brought against them because they do not recognize U.S. federal court authority in
Puerto Rico).
203. See Adam Liptak, Puerto Ricans Angry That US. Overrode Death Penalty Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/17/us/puerto-ricans-angry-that-us-
overrode-death-penalty-ban.html.
204. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employment discrimination only on account of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"), with 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) ("No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is
a member of a language minority group."). Puerto Rico is not a covered jurisdiction under section four
of the VRA. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 344. Lengthier discussion of these proposals is beyond the
scope of this essay, but it is the author's hope that others will formulate precise amendments and
advocate for their implementation.
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